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Abstract 
 
Presidential democratic regimes impose constitutional limits on the duration of the president’s term and 
on the possible occurrence of subsequent reelections. Term limits and reelection restrictions also exist 
in the government of corporations and firms for the chairman of the board and for the board members. In 
this paper, an attempt is made to identify what the major reasons for this limitations and restrictions 
could be. A related archetypical cost structure, also found in Inventory Theory and Waiting Lines Theory, 
is identified and modeled to study factors such as the cost of corruption, which are key factors in 
determining the optimal duration for a government term. A game theoretical consideration of corruption 
and term limitations strategies is presented at the end of the paper. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
Democracies periodically have elections. As opposed to dictatorships and monarchies, the 
candidates to be elected must declare and promise to serve the general interest during his term. It 
may be that this commitment to serve the general interest, though it should be assumed, must be 
declared periodically because for some reason long terms in power for the same government end 
up in polarization and corruption.  
The person in charge is surrounded by a ring of friends and close collaborators which develop 
an adulatory roll blinding his ability to serve the general interest and filtering and redirecting 
decisions to favor particular interest. That has been the case in long-term dictatorships like the 
Shah in Iran, Somoza in Nicaragua, Marcos in Philippines, Duvalier in Haiti, Pinochet in Chile, and 
countless many others in the recent history of modern democracy. This also appears to be the case 
with institutional party dictatorships like the communist party in the Soviet Union previous to its 
dissolution and the PRI in Mexico.  
The problem of determining the optimal or close to optimal duration for a presidential term is 
one that has not been satisfactorily solved in political and administration sciences. Nonetheless 
most democracies have opted for presidential terms with duration between 4 and 7 years.  
Turbulence, change and the conformation of a new political environment induced by the forces of 
Globalization, has prompted in recent years many constitutional reforms. Many of these reforms try 
to extend the duration of the presidential term when this term is close to the lower bound of 4 years, 
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some other to shorten the duration of the term when close to the upper bound of 7 years (Bernales, 
1994).   
In addition, the re-election component is often proposed in variety of combinations which in 
some cases is permitted and in other cases is restricted in some way, for example, reducing the 
period of time from 6 to 4 years and allowing immediate reelection or extending the period from 4 to 
6 years and allowing for re-election but not in the immediately following period -not in two 
consecutive periods (Toonen, 2010; Ansari, 1994). 
Thus, term limits is an issue intimately related to the nature of democracy in a financial capital 
oriented world, it has to do with power separation and the balance of power, with protecting the 
general interest from particular interest and it definitively has to do with human nature, its weakness 
and its greatness and the need for the constitutional subordination and limitation of human ambition 
to principles (Bernales, 1994; Van der Bergh, 2013).       
Term duration is also an issue considered in the Corporate Governance guidelines for 
companies developed by governments and stock exchange organizations. The duration of the term 
for board members in most groups, corporations and firms range form 1 to 6 years (Adams, 2014; 
Mandle, 1999).  Some views maintain that the term of service must not be limited based on the 
value of the insight gained by directors through time into the business and operations of the 
company (Bradenburger, 2011). 
Also there exists the view that long terms do not favor the interest of small investors. Some 
stock exchange organizations recommend short terms of 1 year.       
Summarizing, arguments in favor of longer terms identify the value of specific knowledge, 
learning and experience and also specific costs to be avoided related with frequent elections. The 
arguments for shorter periods fear the polarization of knowledge and learning to favor particular 
interest, also fear of stagnation (Buckley, James L. 2000). 
In general, for national organizations like the Supreme Court and corporations governance 
boards, there are both: costs inversely related and costs directly related to the duration of the term. 
Similarly, reelection is associated with the democratic right that must not be restricted to recognize 
excellence in government but also with corruption, polarization of power, stagnation and self 
interest (Bradenburger, 2011). 
Cost competition in relation to the duration of the term is an archetype which also occurs in a 
variety of problems related to inventory theory   and in waiting lines theory. These problems have 
been successfully solved with the help of elementary mathematical optimization theory in 
management sciences. In particular, a well known solution is the economic order quantity (EOQ) 
(Bengtsson, 2016). 
In terms of methodology it is crucial to keep in mind that mathematical models are not 
necessarily a simplified view of reality, sometimes they serve to identify key interrelations of 
elements that conform reality and allow learning from a systematic analysis of the identified 
archetypical relations.  This paper follows the methodological path to consider a mathematical 
approach regarding the issue of reelection.  The main focus is on the nation-state scope of political 
conditions, but this consideration can be adapted to other kind of leadership such as that of 
enterprises, for example (Reyes, 2003). 
The purpose of this paper is to promote trans-disciplinary work by introducing a mathematical 
model as a tool to approach and analyze the problem of the optimal duration of terms in 
government and its relation to re-election.  Mathematical models in the social sciences have 
become an important component of analysis which allows identifying, clarifying and better 
understanding the relations among the determinant elements concerning social processes events 
(Hillier, 2004).  A contribution from this paper is related to identify structural conditions within social, 
political and entrepreneurship contexts, which in turn have vital consequences on leadership and 
the conducting tasks of allocation of resources in any social organization. 
 
 Term Duration 2.
   
  The following table contains a selected sample of countries with non-parliamentary democratic 
forms of government. The corresponding duration of the presidential term and its relation of 
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acceptance with the re-election element is also included (see Table 1). 
There is no democracy with a 3- year presidential term or with an 8-year term.  From the 
sample above we can observe that there is no consensus as to what the optimal duration of the 
term might be, and if reelection is convenient or not, nor there are principles which might suggest 
the term duration or the reelection issue. The duration of the presidential term and the reelection 
issue in any particular democratic country appear to be determined by majority vote in trial-and-
error processes based on intuitive considerations, and historical events and cultural traditions 
(Petracca, 1992). 
 
Table 1. Presidential terms in selected countries with non-parliamentary democratic forms of 
government  
 
 
 
Source: based on data from the World Bank and United Nations Development Program.  
 
It is interesting to note that the variance of the duration of the terms is relatively small and that it 
appears to be a general consensus that 1 or 2 year terms are too short a period, and 9 or more 
years terms are too long. 
 
 Cost Analysis 3.
 
Let us consider a planning horizon T to be covered by presidential terms of duration t.  If for 
example  years and the presidential term is  then during the period in consideration there 
would have to be  elections. 
That is, the n  number of elections is given by  
 
Clearly if there were presidential elections every year in a given country the campaign costs 
would be a significant burden to be financed. Also the effectiveness of government would be highly 
undermined by the fact that the job requires a period of adjustment and learning of specific 
processes and relations of intervening elements, essential in the decision making of a presidency 
and one year is barely enough.  This last observation is true for any job in any organization 
(Saporiti, 2004). 
Here, two types of costs associated with the number of elections can be identified (Mcdaid, S. 
(2016).  First, there is a cost of the election itself (there are many countries where the costs of the 
elections are partly subsidized by the State). Second, there is a cost of adjustment aggravated by 
the fact that a new government represents a new vision promised to the electing constituents and 
hence there is a tendency to reject the previous government programs giving place to what has 
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been identified as the sharks-fin type of stagnation in public administration (see figure below) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Shark-fin Diagram for Program´s Discontinuity 
Source: Based on concepts contained in Mueller, Dennis (2003) Public Choice: An Introduction. 
New York: Springer.  
 
These costs are directly proportional to the number n of elections and hence inversely proportional 
to the duration of the term.  
Assuming these costs can be computed, then, the total cost associated with the election is: 
CE = Campaigns Costs + Learning Costs + Lack of Continuity Costs  
Therefore in the planning horizon T, the associated   total cost is given by  
 
Related to the duration of the term there are costs due to corruption and polarization of power 
in favor of special interest groups and these costs increase with the duration of the term t.  We may 
assume that corruption drains or diverts the public resources producing an annual loss that 
increases with time. That is, the losses in a particular year are greater than those of the preceding 
year (Streb, 2002; Pérez-Liñán, 2016).  
This basically means that the cost of polarization and corruption is an increasing function of 
the term duration t.   If  the incremental losses are assumed to grow linearly at a rate Cc, then the 
cost function c(t) would be given by c(t) = Cc t  (see figure below), and the cost of polarization and 
corruption  during the period of duration t   would be given by  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Corruption Costs per Term in the Planning Horizon 
Source: Figure 1, and concepts contained in Mueller, Dennis (2003) Public Choice:  
An Introduction. New York: Springer.  
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The total cost during the   periods in the planning horizon T is given by:  
 
 
 Optimal Term 4.
  
The total cost function for the planning horizon T is given by  
 
 
The derivative of   C(t)  is  
 
the optimality condition , gives us  
 
or equivalently     
 
 
 
 
 Costs of New Governments and Corruption 5.
 
The optimal termed obtained above allows us to estimate the relations that must exist between the 
cost of inaugurating a new government CE and the corruption cost rate CC. For example:  
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Also, it can be observed that  
• The optimal duration of the term does not depend on the planning horizon T 
• As corruption is reduced, the optimal term duration increases without bound (like may be 
the case with the Pope’s term)  
• If the system is operating with an optimal duration term t*, reelection would increase total 
polarization and corruption costs. 
• Under the assumptions of this analysis, it becomes clear that corruption and tendency to 
arbitrary or tyrannical governments would be the major objections to long terms in office. 
Re-election appears to be a good alternative provided the power and resources of 
government are not misdirected to secure the re-election. Cyclical management of the 
economy as related to fiscal and expenditure policies has been associated with reelection.  
Perhaps, governments with constitutional re-election should consider tight scrutiny for 
collaborators to continue working with the re-elected president.  
• Whenever reelection limitations are eliminated, the constitution must be reformed to 
maintain an adequate balance of power and to  protect the general interest from particular 
ones   
• Since the cost of electing a president plus the learning cost of adapting to a new job 
environment can be thought of as relatively constant in a given period, the optimal term 
can be expressed as a function of the corruption level. That is, 
,     
 The following graph is obtained: 
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Graph 1: 
Source: this study quantitative procedures.  
 
 Game Theoretical Consideration of Corruption and the Duration of Government Term 6.
 
The previous argument development was worked out under the assumption that corruption costs 
increase with term duration. Corruption appears to be endemic to today’s democracies and as such 
it is assumed to manifest itself in an increasing manner as new governments begin to exercise their 
mandates. It appears that there is a learning process involved in the manifestation of corruption 
(Schmitt-Beck, 2016). 
As a consequence society tends to reduce term duration precisely to curve down corruption 
costs.  Clearly corruption benefits the corrupt people (CP) in that give them money and power, 
likewise affect negatively common citizens by bending the rules of the game to serve particular 
interest. It hinders society.  Pictured as a zero-sum game, society looses at least what the corrupt 
ones secure for themselves (Gerber, 2016; Witko, 2016). 
Suppose that a corrupt player can select three courses of action where the intensity of 
corruption can be selected to be high, medium or low and that society can give an extension to the 
term duration from 4 to 5,6, 7 or 8 years then the following payoff matrix can be examined: 
 
 
 
The denominators in the medium and low options are simply to indicate the lower intensity of each 
level.  It can be seen that row 1 and column 1 are dominant strategies respectively and hence the 
upper left corner is a saddle point where maximinj (aij) = minjmaxi(aij) = a11,  indicating that without 
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proper control, corruption  has a clear  trend to manifest itself at its maximum level. The duration of 
the term tends to be decreased to the minimum possible level as best response to the presence of 
corruption.  
 
 Conclusions and Final Considerations 7.
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the previous optimality and the game theoretical 
considerations.  
First, long terms are most desirable whenever society has an honest government, which is 
committed to serve and actually serves the general interest.  
Second, corruption whenever it takes place tends to increase with time and manifest at the 
maximum possible level.  
Third, one of society’s best responses to corruption practices appears to be the limitation of 
term duration; even when a society has the risk of changing of corrupt people, that is, starting new 
cycles of corruption.   
Regarding this last point, it is important to consider the influence of social and legal penalties 
imposed on the corrupt. Exemplary punishments serve as deterrents for continuing corrupt 
practices. 
Thus, reelection may well play the role of the confidence vote in parliamentary systems; if 
there are signs of honest and efficient government; presumably, people surely will reelect the 
incumbent government. This amounts to extending the duration of a term whenever the costs of 
corruption are kept to a minimum.  
Reelected governments should have a similar mechanism to evaluate its internal performance 
to prevent the growth of corrupt practices by some its public servants. Public servants 
accountability and autocontrol systems at all levels of government may well be the best internal 
strategies to keep corruption under control. However, corruption is just a symptom or a systemic 
consequence of the structure of today’s society. It cannot be eliminated within the system. To 
eliminate corruption the system must be redefined. 
The game played between Society and Corrupt People is a dynamic one. It has to do with 
equity and fair play. This game can be played at different recursion levels in society and may affect 
the different forms of organizations, governments and stakeholder´s interest.  
To decide in a firm, what the optimal duration of a board of directors term is, one must 
consider not only the value of experience of board members but also the extent to which long terms 
may affect negatively the interest of the small investors in favor the particular interest of the big 
shareholders. 
A more general reflection can be centered on the fact that financial capital´s particular interest 
is permeating government decisions and legislative initiatives at a global level, thus creating a 
structure that favors particular interest. The main challenge of today’s world society appears to be, 
to defend itself from its different forms of government.  
This noticeable trend suggests that the game of society versus corruption may well be ended 
with the collapse of the Nation State and many of its democratic practices. For today’s democracies 
have no meaningful way to decide on the relevant issues that affect the development of society 
(Dunn, 2015). 
The financial capital interest appears to have created a systemic attractor that may be the 
major source of corruption and is reshaping the world. Interest rates and future discount rates affect 
the ability of society to develop and implement long range plans for its welfare and sustained 
development with peace and equity.   
These rates hinder the possibilities of cooperation among its members. A new global structure 
is being defined and society and its primary constituents must play the global game with new 
emerging rules that are not even partially understood by the players of the game. 
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